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Introduction
Our study analyzes gender dierences in reciprocal behavior. We apply a modied dictator game based on Cherry et al.'s (2002) study where dictators had to do a real-eort task before deciding on the money amount to be dictated to recipients. In contrast to most standard dictator games (e.g. Kahneman et al. (1986) , Eckel and Grossman (1996) and Dana et al. (2006) ), Cherry et al. (2002) report that 95% of their dictators behaved in line with the standard neoclassical prediction of selsh maximization of their own monetary income.
1
Our study modies the Cherry et al. (2002) setup in that we make the recipients (rather than the dictators) conduct the real-eort task. Since recipients move before dictators, their eort decisions resemble the rst move in a trust game (Berg et al. (1995) ). That is: if the recipients do not trust dictators, they should not invest eort. Note here a crucial dierence to the trust game is that our game does not include an outside option, i.e. all rst-movers have to send their money to the second-movers.
2 According to our setup's resemblance to a trust game, we expect gender dierences in terms of dictators' trustworthiness in our setup. We therefore hypothesize that female dictators will show increased reciprocity to recipients who have worked. We expect them to reciprocate a good working performance by strongly reducing their taking-rates if the recipients performed well. This is motivated by the trust game literature on gender dierences, which reports that female second-movers more often reciprocate rst-movers' oers by sending back positive amounts (e.g. Croson and Buchan (1999) , Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2003) , Snijders and Keren (2004) , and Buchan et al. (2008) ).
3
Our setup is most closely related to Rue's (1998) study on tipping behavior in the ultimatum game and in the dictator game. Here, the recipients also endogenized the money to be divided by doing a real-eort task, before dictators decided about the split. The main dierence in our study is that we focus on gender dierences in reciprocal behavior. 4 Related is also Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), who demonstrate that dictators make signicantly lower oers when recipients did a real-eort task. However, there are two crucial dierences: The authors used a standard dictator game as a control treatment. In contrast, we use a baseline treatment, where dictators can take money from recipients in a windfall environment and, furthermore, we focus on gender dierences. Our results not only successfully replicate Rue's (1998) 
and Oxoby and
Spraggon's (2008) ndings; we also establish that female dictators are aected by reciprocity and show dierent magnitudes of reciprocal behavior depending on recipients' working performance. 1 Further, some dictator games report that dictators decrease their taking-rates due to increased anonymity (e.g. Homan et al. (1996) , Koch and Normann (2008) ). 2 That setup ensures that dictators have to decide about both: successful and low performing recipients. 3 There also exist papers which report gender eects in standard dictator games (e.g. Eckel and Grossman (1998) , Bolton and Katok (1995) , Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) ). For a complete survey see Croson and Gneezy (2009). 4 Carlsson et al. (2010) also study gender eects in a dictator game with a real-eort task. However in this setup the dictators do the real-eort task. The authors do not nd a signicant gender dierence.
Experimental Design
We use a modied dictator game with two dierences to the standard game. The rst dierence is that the size of the pot which the dictators decide about is not constant. The second dierence is that there are two stages in both the Windfall and the Real Eort treatment. As in Cherry et al. (2002) , there is a rst stage (money-generation stage) in which the size of the pot is determined. Dictators only decide in the second stage (allocation stage) about the allocation of the money.
In the Real Eort treatment the participants were randomly assigned to two groups of equal size and split between separate rooms, rooms A and B. In the money-generation stage, subjects in room A (the recipients) had the opportunity to take a quiz which consisted of 20 questions taken from the Graduate Record Examination test. 5 Depending on their results, we allocated money to the subjects such that subjects who answered at least 13 questions correctly 6 were given 10e, otherwise they received 5e. Subjects knew that they had 20 minutes to complete the quiz. As we corrected the tests, dictators in room B had to wait for approximately 30 minutes and we provided them with coee and cake. The allocation stage of the Real Eort treatment randomly matched subjects in room A with those in room B. Neither subjects in room A nor subjects in room B knew the identities of their partners. Furthermore subjects in room A were informed about the amount of money we allocated, which depended on their results in the quiz. Altogether we conducted ve sessions of the Real Eort treatment. Four of these sessions had the structure explained above. In the remaining session we checked whether dictators are sensitive to overcondence. We therefore provided them with a copy of the exam questions taken by those in group A (which may have induced positive or negative reciprocity, depending on the dictator's self-assessment of his or her own ability). Dictators were given the chance to have a look at the exam questions for 10 minutes, before they were asked to estimate the number of questions they would have solved correctly. After making their allocation decision we asked them to do the test, to check whether they had overestimated their own performance. However, we did not nd signicant dierences in dictator-takings, if we compare this session with the other four Real Eort sessions (Mann-Whitney test, p-value = 0.980). Thus we pooled the data from 5 These questions are based on basic arithmetic concepts (e.g. algebra, geometry and data analysis). 6 The threshold of 13 correct answers was calibrated based on a pilot session of the GRE test among the undergraduate students of a seminar at Frankfurt University. 7 Before making their decision dictators were also told that the recipients knew (before they started the real-eort task) that a dictator will decide on the allocation. 8 Statistical analysis of this data revealed that only gender and age were signicant variables, i.e. older people and women are more likely to take lower amounts. In contrast cultural dierences (e.g. people's religion) were not signicant at all. this session with the data from the other four Real Eort sessions.
The Windfall treatment was identical to the Real Eort treatment except that the recipients did not have the opportunity to take the quiz. Instead, the pot size was determined randomly.
Subjects had to draw a lottery ticket worth either 5e or 10e, and they had a 50% chance of winning either a low or high stake size. In order to keep both treatments comparable, dictators also had to wait for 30 minutes and we provided them with coee and cake.
We used ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) The same is true for the Real Eort treatment (p-value = 0.694). The brief analysis showed that dictators were prone to reciprocal behavior when recipients worked and successfully generated the large pot.
Dictator-taking: Average results

Dictator-taking: Gender eects
We now analyze dictator-taking, and separate the choices by gender in order to test Hypotheses 1-3. In order to test Hypothesis 1, we compare females' taking-rates in the Windfall and Real Eort treatment. Since reciprocity plays an important role in the Real Eort treatment, Hypothesis 1 predicts that female dictators will be strongly aected by the fact that recipients have worked.
Testing Hypothesis 1 we nd a signicant treatment eect for female dictators, i.e. the average taking-rate of female dictators is 63.30% in Real Eort compared to 74.02% in Windfall (p-value = 0.021). Therefore we reject the null hypothesis that female dictators take the same amount from recipients who did a real-eort task compared to the case where recipients received a windfall gain. We thus nd strong support for Hypothesis 1. If we analyze male decisions, we do not nd that the real-eort task stimulates reciprocal behavior, i.e. male dictators take 73.81% in Windfall and 75.39% in Real Eort (p-value = 0.720). Interestingly male dictator-taking is very stable. They always take around 75%. Furthermore this eect holds for all of our sessions. 9
This also emphasized by Figure 1 which presents diagrams comparing the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of male and female dictators in our two treatments. The left diagram shows the Windfall treatment and the right diagram the Real Eort treatment. 9 We also ran three sessions (with 96 subjects) of the Real Eort treatment where dictators did not have to wait 30 minutes, but decided immediately. This was done in order to control for possible time eects. Even though male dictators decreased their takings by 10 percent points (note there is great variance in the data: Some male dictators took 0% and others took 100%) we nd no statistical support for a dierence (p-value = 0.249). Furthermore our results show that female dictators take exactly the same amounts in both variants of the Real Eort treatment (p-value = 0.891). We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this issue. First: male and female CDFs do not dier at all when dictators decide about windfall money (KS-Test, Max. D = 0.062, p-value = 1.000). However, there exist crucial gender dierences in the CDFs when dictators decide about money which has been generated by a Real Eort task (KS-Test, Max. D = 0.326, p-value = 0.011). It is remarkable that 57% of female dictators choose the equal split decision as opposed to only 37% of male dictators. Furthermore only 16% of female dictators take the whole pot from the recipients. This stands in strong contrast to 45% of male dictators who choose the 100% taking-rate.
RESULT 1:
Comparing the Windfall with the Real Eort treatment we nd signicant gender dierences, i.e. in Real Eort, female dictators take considerably smaller amounts compared to Windfall. In contrast, male dictators do not reduce their taking-rates at all. Table 2 shows that in the Real Eort treatment female dictators do not care about recipients' performance: They take 63.33% from 5e recipients and 63.26% from 10e recipients (p-value = 0.852). Thus we cannot reject the null hypothesis which postulates that female dictators do not care about recipients' performance. We therefore have to discard Hypothesis 2. Focusing on male dictator-taking in the Real Eort treatment, it appears that they also do not care about recipients' performance, i.e. they take 74.21% from recipients who generated a small pot and 76.52% from recipients who generated the large pot (p-value = 0.833).
RESULT 2:
In the Real Eort treatment, female as well as male dictators do not take smaller amounts from successful recipients who generated the large pot.
In order to test Hypothesis 3 we now compare the treatment eect generated for the 5e pot with the treatment eect for the 10e pot. Focusing on female dictator-taking for the 5e pot, we nd that they take 72.68% in the Windfall treatment and 63.33% in the Real Eort treatment.
However, this dierence is not signicant (p-value = 0.154). 10 If we focus on the large pot, we 10 Note there exists weak signicance for a one sided p-value, i.e. p-value = 0.077. nd that female dictators in the Windfall treatment take 76.11% compared to 63.26% in the Real Eort treatment. Thus the dierence in taking-rates is larger when deciding about recipients who generated a large pot. In contrast to the 5e pot, this dierence is weakly signicant (pvalue = 0.069). 11 We therefore reject the null hypothesis that the dierence in female dictators' taking-rates between 5e recipients and 10e recipients is not dierent. Thus we nd support for Hypothesis 3. Interestingly females take nearly the same amounts from 5e and 10e recipients in Real Eort. Therefore, it cannot be that they were inuenced by negative reciprocity in the case of 5e recipients. Nevertheless, the dierence in female taking-rates is larger if recipients generated a large pot. This is due to the fact that female dictators in Windfall take a larger amount from 10e recipients compared to 5e recipients.
12 Male dictators do not show dierent magnitudes of reciprocity. That is: taking-rates from 5e-recipients in Windfall and Real Eort are not dierent (p-value = 0.540). The same is true for the treatment dierence in taking-rates for the 10e recipients (p-value = 0.947).
RESULT 3:
The dierence in female taking-rates, caused by the real-eort task is higher if recipients generated 10e compared to the case where only 5e was achieved. In contrast, male dictators do not show this behavior.
Discussion
Do women behave more reciprocally than men? The answer is yes.
We analyzed a modied dictator game with a real-eort task (based on Cherry et al. (2002)) where dictators were asked to dictate a money amount which was generated by the recipients.
Our results show that women signicantly decrease taking-rates when the recipients generated the money (to be divided) by a real-eort task instead of a lottery task. Furthermore, female dictators decreased taking-rates more strongly if recipients generated a large pot compared to the opposed case, where recipients only generated a small pot. In contrast, male dictators did not show reciprocal behavior at all, i.e. they did not lower their taking-rates in the environment of the real-eort task.
If we do not focus on gender, the general results show that dictators are sensitive to the realeort task, however, the result depends on whether the recipient generated a large pot. That is: dictators only signicantly lower taking-rates when the recipient was successful and generated 10e. Thus we conrm the results of Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) who argue that dictators are inuenced by property rights legitimization. 13 Further, our results are in line with Rue (1998) 11 Note there exists a signicant dierence for a one sided p-value, i.e. p-value = 0.035. 12 Probably they do not grant a large pot to recipients because the money was endogenized by pure chance. 13 However we extend their framework by applying a treatment where dictators decide about windfall money who points out that dictators treat low performing recipients as if they did not work at all. Our study emphasizes real-eort's impacts on gender dierences due to reciprocal behavior. That is:
we extend Rue's (1998) and Oxoby and Spraggon's (2008) studies and give an explanation for their ndings.
It is interesting that we only nd a signicant eect for female dictators. Thus our study sheds new light on gender dierences in reciprocal behavior driven by a real-eort task. Our paper therefore provides important new insights as an explanation for Rue's (1998) and Oxoby and Spraggon's (2008) results. These ndings seem to provide valuable new insights in terms of other-regarding preferences induced by a real-eort task. 14 For the future, it seems to be promising to uncover further gender dierences in setups with real eort tasks.
